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1 Introduction
In our paper, we will present and justify a new concept of duality for general TU-games
resulting from a careful reconsideration of some basic concepts of coalitional TU-games.
Our work has been motivated by a deep dissatisfaction with the way conceptual problems
for coalitional game theory are neglected, disdained or just ignored in a large part of the
actual literature. TU-games are often just treated as elements of a vector space without
simultaneous monitoring of the effects of mathematical operations on the underlying social
or economic scenarios that are modelled in an aggregate stylized way by the respective
TU-games. Questions as to which mathematical operations on games are coherent with
the feasible actions and specific structures of the underlying social or economic scenario
are asked only rarely in the literature. Exceptions are the classic works of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), McKinsey (1952), Luce and Raiffa (1957) and the later books by
Rapoport (1970), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) and, in particular, Myerson (1991).
To indicate what the most general understanding of the intention of coalitional cooper-
ative games is, we quote from a very recent book whose authors have been also contributed
significantly to game theory. In Chapter 16 on coalitional games with transferable utility of
Maschler et al. (2013), we find on page 659:
“Coalitional games model situations in which players may cooperate to achieve their
goals. It is assumed that every set of players can form a coalition and engage in a binding
agreement that yields them a certain amount of profit. The maximal amount that a coalition
can generate through cooperation is called the worth of the coalition.”
And on page 672 we find:
“The main questions that are the focus of coalitional game theory include: 1. What
happens when the players play the game? What coalitions will form, and if a coalition S is
formed, how does it divide the worth v(S) among its members? 2. What would a judge or
an arbitrator recommend that the players do? The answers to these two questions are quite
different. The question regarding the coalitional structure that the players can be expected
to form is a difficult one, and will not be addressed in this book. We will often assume that
the grand coalition N is formed and ask how will the players divide among them the worth
v(N).”
This “assumption that the grand coalition will be formed” is implicit in a huge part
of the treatments of coalitional games in the literature. It is even explicitly stated as a
formal assumption already in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) who write on page 258 in their
Section 4 on coalitional games:
“. . . we assume that the coalitional games with transferable payoff that we study have
the property that the worth of the coalition N of all players is at least as large as the sum of
the worths of the members of any partition of N . This assumption ensures that it is optimal
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that the coalition N of all players forms, as is required by our interpretations of the solution
concepts we study (though formal analysis is meaningful without this assumption)”.
Such games are called cohesive in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) and complete in
Sun et al. (2008). We shall use both terms in this article. While for cohesive games the
standard notion of efficiency that takes v(N) as the benchmark is justified, it is inadequate
and even defective for non-cohesive games. This fact is the reason for our skeptical view on
the use of the predominant definition of a dual game for all TU-games rather than only for
super-additive ones. Cohesiveness will play the crucial role in our paper.
The definition of a TU-game as a pair (N, v) where v is a mapping from 2N , the power
set of the set of players N , to the real numbers that associates to every subset S of N its worth
v(S) is so general that it not only allows the “game theoretic” representation of a huge class of
various, very different scenarios but also admits many games that hardly allow a meaningful
direct economic or social interpretation. It is therefore very likely and in fact often the case
that certain specific classes of games require specific treatments and solution concepts and, in
particular, an explicit mentioning of the restriction to the considered specific class. We feel
that most important inadequate definitions for general TU-games in the recent literature
are those of feasible and of efficient payoff vectors. Based on the grand coalition’s worth
v(N) as a benchmark, they lead via preimputations, imputations and additional axioms to
solutions of games. While these notions of feasibility and efficiency appear adequate on
cohesive games they represent only a “second best” feasibility and efficiency in the case of
general games. Three different definitions of efficiency that we will have to distinguish are
explicitly defined and discussed in Bejan and Gomez (2012). The careful comparison of
their impacts on the interpretation of those coalitional functions they are applied to will be
crucial. It is in fact instrumental for our definition of a dual game that is applicable and
meaningful for all TU-games and will turn out to coincide with the usual one on the class
of super-additive games.
Two other concepts whose exact meaning and use in the literature needs a careful
investigation are those of a coalition and of a coalitional function. Finally, and most
importantly for our expressed goal, we will have to deal with duality in TU-games and, in
particular with duality of TU-games. This is the content of Section 4. In Section 2, we
shall introduce concepts, notation and most of the definitions. In Section 3, the concepts of
coalition and coalitional function are considered in detail. We discuss the varied positions
concerning their meanings in the literature since their introduction by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944), where the coalitional functions had been introduced as characteristic
function forms for non-cooperative games in usual (or strategic) form.
Section 5 builds the central part of our article. There, our duality concept is defined
and justified. This section has six subsections. In Subsection 5.1, we discuss the feasibility
and efficiency of payoff vectors in TU-games. Subsection 5.2 is devoted to the interpretation
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of duality of TU-games in the literature. Subsection 5.3 provides a justification of our use of
partitions rather than balanced families. Subsection 5.4 is dealing with the relation of our
duality to a modification of Peleg’s (1986) reduced game property. In Subsection 5.5, we
seperate the use of Bondavera-Shapley balancing weights from the question of core existence.
We modify the Bondavera-Shapley duality in such a way that the joint optimal value of the
underlying dual programs becomes smaller and equals the worth of the grand coalition in
the cohesive hull vc of the game v. Finally, Subsection 5.6 discusses the close relation of the
duality of TU-games with a duality of coalition production economies introduced in Sun et
al. (2008), extended and simplified in Inoue (2012).
In Section 6 we collect our results on duality which indicate differences or similarities
with the recent duality literature. Section 7 concludes with remarks on future research.
2 Notation, Definitions and Terminology
2.1 General Mathematical Tools
The symbols ⊆ [⊂], \ represents the [strict] inclusion and subtraction for sets, respectively.
N is the set of natural numbers and N0 := N ∪ {0}. R denotes the field and one-
dimensional vector space of real numbers. The canonical [weak] ordering on R is denoted by
> (≥).
RN is the real vector space of functions x : N → R. The natural weak ordering ≥ on
RN is defined pointwise. For x, y ∈ RN , we define x > y by [x ≥ y and x 6= y] and x y by
[xi > yi for all i ∈ N ].
For any S ⊆ N , the indicator function 1S : N → R is defined by 1S(i) = 1 for all i ∈ S,
otherwise 0.
The set of all subsets ofN is the power set ofN , denoted by 2N . We defineN := 2N\{∅}.
(RN)∗ and (RN )∗ are the dual vector space of RN and RN , respectively. They are
the spaces of real valued linear forms on RN and RN , respectively.
We define bilinear maps on RN × (RN)∗ and RN × (RN )∗ by
〈., .〉 : RN × (RN)∗ → R : (x, x∗) 7−→ 〈x, x∗〉 := ∑
i∈N
xix
∗
i ,〈
., .
〉
: RN × (RN )∗ → R : (v, λ) 7−→
〈
v, λ
〉
:=
∑
S∈N
v(S)λ(S).
For any S ∈ N , we have 〈x,1S〉 =
∑
i∈N
xi1S(i) =
∑
i∈S
xi =: x(S). We use this bold face
version x(S) in deviation of the confusing use of x(S) in the TU-literature that conflicts
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with the standard mathematical definition x(S) := {x(i) | i ∈ S}. It allows us to visibly
distinguish between a vector x ∈ RN and the additive game x ∈ RN generated by x.
In complete anology to our notational conventions in the context of RN , we use the
notation in the context of RN .
For any v ∈ RN , λ ∈ (RN )∗ and ß ⊆ N , we define vß := (v(T ))T∈ß, λß := (λ(T ))T∈ß,
and
〈
., .
〉ß
: Rß × (Rß)∗ → R : (vß, λß) 7−→
∑
S∈ß
vß(S)λß(S) .
For ß = N , we have
〈
., .
〉N
=:
〈
., .
〉
and λN = λ. Therefore, we have for any ß ⊆ N ,
〈(vß, 0), (λß, 0)〉 =
〈
vß, λß
〉ß
=
∑
S∈ß
vß(S)λß(S) =
∑
S∈N
v(S)λ(S)1ß(S).
Consider some set ß ⊆ N . A partition of unity on N subordinate to ß is a mapping
λ˜ : N ×N → R+ such that
1. For all j ∈ N , Supp λ˜(•, j) := {T ∈ ß | λ˜(T, j) 6= 0} ∈ ß
2. For all j ∈ N , ∑
S∈ß
λ˜(S, j) = 1.
The collection ß ⊆ N in the definition of the partition of unity on N is balanced if
it satisfies for all S ∈ ß and i ∈ N , λ˜(S, i) = λß(S)1S(i) = λ(S)1S(i). The real numbers in
{λ(S)}S∈ß are called balancing weights for the subsets S ∈ ß. For each balanced collection
ß, the system λß ∈ Rß+ of balancing weights is an element of ([0, 1]ß)∗ ⊂ (Rß+)∗ ≡ (Rß)∗+ ⊂
(Rß)∗. We denote the set of balanced collections by ß ⊆ N by B.
A partition of S ⊆ N is a set {T1, T2, . . . Tm} of pairwise disjoint subsets Ti ⊆ S
covering S. The set of partitions of S ⊆ N is denoted Π(S). A bi-partition of S ⊆ N is
a set {T, S \ T} with T ⊂ S. The set of bi-partitions of S ⊆ N is denoted by Π2(S), and
maybe identified with 2S \ {∅}.
2.2 TU-games
A cooperative coalitional game with transferable utility, for short TU-game, is an
ordered pair (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . n} represents the set of players and v ∈ R2N with
v(∅) = 0. The coalition function v is completely described by its restriction to RN , which
by slight abuse of notation we also denote by v. We define V := RN as the vector space of
TU-games, and denote its dual space by V ∗ := (RN )∗.
Frequently used properties of TU-games are
• monotonicity: v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N ,
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• super-additivity: v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for all disjoint S, T ⊆ N ,
• convexity: v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ⊆ N ,
• sub-addivity: v is sub-additive if and only if −v is super-additive,
• concavity: v is concave if and only if −v is convex.
The super-additive (resp. convex) hull of a TU-game (N, v) is the smallest super-
additive (resp. convex) TU-game (N,w) such that for any S ⊆ N , w(S) ≥ v(S). The
super-additive and convex hulls of (N, v) are denoted by (N, v˜) and (N, vˆ), respectively.
A TU-game (N, v) is cohesive (or complete) if v(N) = v˜(N) = max
pi∈Π(N)
∑
T∈pi
v(T ). In
a cohesive game, the presumption that the grand coalition N will form is justified by the
efficiency requirement (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Arnold and Schwalbe, 2002; Sun
et al., 2008). The cohesive hull or completion of a TU-game (N, v) is the TU-game
(N, vc) such that vc(S) = v(S) for all S ⊂ N and vc(N) = v˜(N).
A TU-game (N, v) is balanced if for each balanced collection ß of subsets of
N and associated system λß = {λ(S)}S∈ß of balancing weights holds: for all i ∈ N ,
v(N) ≥
〈
v, λß
〉ß
=
∑
S∈ß
v(S)λ(S). The balanced hull of (N, v) is the TU-game (N, vb)
with vb(S) = v(S) for all S ⊂ N and vb(N) := max
ß∈B
∑
T∈ß
λ(T )v(T ).
A subgame (S, vS) of (N, v) is defined by vS := v|2S\{∅}. A TU-game (N, v) is totally
balanced if all subgames (S, vS) with S ⊆ N are balanced. The totally balanced hull or
cover of (N, v) is (N, v¯), which is the smallest totally balanced game with v¯(S) ≥ v(S) for
all S ⊆ N , i. e., with v¯(S) = vbS(S) for all S ⊆ N .
We will restrict in this paper the standard definition of duality for TU-games to the
class of super-additive games. Later in this work, we shall give a definition of duality (called
c-duality in Aslan and Duman (2018)) that holds for all TU-games and coincides with the
∗duality defined next on super-additive games.
A TU-game (N, v∗) is the dual game of the super-additive game (N, v) if v∗(S) =
v(N)− v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
In contrast to almost all of the recent literature dealing with TU-duality, the Wikipedia
article on “Cooperative game theory” (2019) defines duality in the described way above,
but restricts this to “profit games” and “value games” as opposed to “cost games”. The
interpretation of v∗ offered there is that (N, v∗) represents the “opportunity costs for S of not
joining the grand coalition N”. The dual game (N, v∗) is then denoted as the “cost game”.
The article interprets “value games” and “cost games” as two “in some sense equivalent”
alternative ways of modelling the same problem.
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2.3 Remarks on Our Terminology
There are three notions in colloquial English as well as in technical terms that describe in
various contexts “cooperative” interaction of people in groups or sets in more or less obliging
specified legal or codified ways. These notions are coalition, syndicate and cartel. All
of them have been used in different varied meanings in economics. There is certainly some
freedom in using these concepts as technical concepts with different specifications of their
interpretations. We think that it is unavoidable to make use of this freedom in order to get
rid of obvious inconsistencies in the use of the term “coalition” in coalitional game theory.
There is an extensive literature focused on the problem and processes of coalition building
in game theory. But this has not yet succeeded in scrutinizing the prevalent presumption in
large parts of the literature of coalitional games that the grand coalition will be formed.
A terminology where coalitions defined just as subsets are used as “forming” of coalitions
is meaningless. As we will explicate later in detail, we need to distinguish different sorts
of player subsets and different steps of negotiations of players that take place outside and
“before” the commitment of players to participate in a TU-game (N, v). Following Harsanyi
(1959) and Rapoport (1970), we shall replace the term coalition as a synonym for a subset
of players by syndicate. Syndicates are potential coalitions. They may negotiate about
the redistribution of total payoffs in various coalitions. But they may also negotiate about
binding cooperation between coalitions once they have been received their respective worths.
Coalitions have formed when they have formally committed to participate in the game and to
cooperation of their members in accordance with the rules embodied in v. This interpretation
of a coalition is supported by Hart and Kurz (1983) who write on page 1047: “By a “coalition”
is meant a group of “players” (e.g. economic or political agents) which decide to act together,
as one unit, relative to the rest of the players.”
Cartels are also syndicates with a commitment structure. They may consist of players
who are members of different coalitions built by enterring the game and committing them-
selves to obey the rules of v. Members of cartels are bound to contribute to the cartels’
certain prespecified shares of their total payoffs received as members of possibly different
coalitions in the game.
Each player i ∈ N will be a member of exactly one of coalition S ⊆ N . She is a member
of each syndicate T ⊆ N and maybe a member of several cartels C ⊆ N . A cartel may form
a coalition or a union of disjoint coalitions but can be relevant for the game only under these
aspects but not in its function as a cartel. We shall not deal with the pre-plaey negoatiations
of syndicates on which cartels would build. While syndicates are just subsets of the set of all
players, coalitions and cartels are subsets supplemented by certain commitment structures.
The detailed specifications of these structures are not described.
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3 Coalitions and Coalition Functions
This section is an indispensable preparation for Section 4 where we will try to distil the
essence of the concept of duality for TU-games before in Section 5 we motivate, introduce
and also justify our duality concept.
3.1 Coalitions
Although the term coalition is the central notion in defining coalitional games most of the
literature is wasting its conceptual power by just identifying it with a subset of N , the set
of players, in a TU-game (N, v). Like in the opaque but coherent definition of an extensive
form game, one could associate with some pure mathematical objects names that reflect
their interpretation in the social or economic model that one intends to build also for the
model denoted coalitional game with transferable utility. Obviously, members of a
set S of natural numbers are not per se players. They are representing players when the
interpretation of what this means in the model is clear. An apt example is mathematics
itself, where sets are denoted spaces when they carry a specific mathematical structure.
Often this results in the description by some tuple collecting the set under question and the
structures it is endowed with. Once introduced in that way often only the symbol for the
set is written when the space is considered.
In cooperative game theory, the notion of a coalition is not treated in an analogous
way. The reason for this becomes apparent when a set of players has formed a coalition. It
is not described or even represented by exact mathematical terms what exactly the coalition’s
and its players’ contractually defined potential actions, rights and duties are. That becomes
evident when we use the identification of a subset S of N with the coalition S and
ask one of the two fundamental questions of cooperative game theory: When will players
in a coalition S (subset of N) build the coalition S? So coalitions in a game (N, v)
must, as already argued in Subsection 2.3, be more than just subsets of N .
The first game theorists have been obviously aware of this fact. Already Neumann
(1928) writes in his Section 4: “the case n = 3 discusses the problems of deriving a value
in analogy to two person games and hints to the possibility of any subset of two players
to build a coalition in order to achieve higher expected payoffs.” Other early quotations
confirm this view:
McKinsey (1952, p. 304): “The theory of games is largely concerned with the questions
of what combinations of players (“coalitions”) will be formed and what payments the
players can be expected to make to each other as inducements to join the various coalitions.”
Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 156): “Thus any theory of collusion, i.e., of coalition for-
mation, has a distinct ad hoc flavor.”
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Aumann and Peleg (1960, p. 174): “. . . a coalition B is effective for a payoff vector
x if the members of B, by joining forces, can play so that each player i in B receives at least
. . . ”
This intuitive definition is open to a number of interpretations. A rather conservative
one had been adopted by von Neumann and Morgenstern by assuming that the most the
members of B can count on is what they can get if the players of N \B form a coalition
whose purpose it is to minimize the payoffs of B.
Shapley and Shubik (1969, p. 11): “. . . a game is an ordered pair (N, v), where N is
a finite set [the players] and v is a function from the subsets of N [coalitions] to the reals
satisfying v(∅) = 0, called the characteristic function.”
Rapoport (1970, p. 170-180)(referring to Harsanyi (1959)): “. . . bargaining positions of
the players in the process of coalition formation”; p.171-172: “These subsets [of N ]
are called syndicates. They are distinguished from coalitions in that each player
is considered as a member of every syndicate viewed as a set of players which
includes him. Actually, the syndicates can be viewed as the potential coalitions.”; p.
286: “. . . two fundamental questions: 1) Which coalitions are likely to form? 2) How will
the members of a coalition apportion their joint payoff?”; p.287: “Game theory is virtually
silent on the question of which coalitions are likely to form.”
Myerson (1991, p. 418): “Any nonempty subset of the set of players may be called a
coalition.”
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 257): “. . . subset S of N(a coalition)”
Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003, p. 10): “Let S be a sub-coalition of N . If S forms . . . then
its members get the amount v(S) of money. . . ” and “if a coalition S forms it may divide
v(S) among its members in any feasible way.”
Peters (2008, p. 151): “It is important to note that the term ’coalition’ is used for any
subset of the set of players. So a coalition is not necessarily formed.”
Maschler et al. (2013, p. 660): “Cooperative game theory concentrates on questions
such as which sets of players’ coalitions will agree to conclude binding agreements?”
The search for a definition of a coalition in articles dealing with the duality of TU-
games led us to the following:
Funaki (1998): “The value of a coalition in a given game. . . ”
Kikuta (2007): “A coalition is a subset of N .”
Oishi and Nakayama (2009): “v(S) is the worth that coalition S can obtain by itself.”
Oishi et al. (2016): “v(S) represents what coalition S can achieve on its own.”
We can conclude from the totality of quotations above that during the 75 years since
the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the definition of the technical term
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coalition has not only undergone some change but is up to now not consistently treated as
one well-defined technical term. The possible actions of coalitions or their members may well
depend on the interpretation of the term coalition. In Section 3.2, we will be confronted with
a similar terminological vagueness when dealing with the classical characteristic function
and their later, broader defined version called now mostly coalition function.
With the exception of Kikuta (2007), the articles from 1998 and later concerned with
duality of games, do not even define the concept of a coalition explicitly but rather leave it
to the readers to conclude from their notation and terminology that they identify them with
subsets of players. This is a distressing fact because a plausible distinction of what players
in syndicates (or potential coalitions) could do as compared with what formed coalitions,
committed to specified kinds of cooperation, could do to the rest of the players is in our views
indispensable for a soundly based definition of dual TU-games. For instance, in a non-super-
additive game (N, v) there must be a part of legal constraints embodied in v that prevents
some (formed) coalitions S from splitting into sub-coalitions and thereby increasing their
joint total payoffs. The players of these sub-coalitions would have been able, as not yet
committed syndicates, to form sub-coalitions of S and thereby to achieve under the
“rules” embodied in v aggregate payoffs that due to the lack of super-additivity are out of
reach for them as the formed coalition S in the game (N, v).
All works after Aumann and Peleg (1960) quoted above, with the exception of Rapoport
(1970) define coalitions explicitly as subsets of players. The formulation in Peleg and
Sudho¨lter (2003) is the one in which the target of our criticism can be best recognized,
namely the uncommented double use of the term coalition for two different objects: formed
and not yet formed coalitions. Peters (2008), though also identifying coalitions with subsets
of games, states explicitly that he is using this notation for formed and not formed coali-
tions. That alerts the reader but does not make it coherent! The verbal distinction between
coalitions and formed coalitions that can be found occasionally in the game theory literature
is almost nowhere fortified by a corresponding formal definition.
The only satisfactory way of dealing with this (termino)logical problem is in our opinion
that by Rapoport (1970), based on Harsanyi (1959). Coalition and syndicate are in
colloquial language often close to synonyms, and Harsanyi might well have used them as
technical terms in the converse order of meanings. His merit is the explicit distinction of
mere subsets of players, syndicates in his terminology, from subsets of players loaded with
certain contractual commitments of its members, denoted coalitions. The excellent book
of Rapoport (1970) is the only one in which this is discussed in a detailed and transparent
manner. We shall adopt his terminology in the rest of this article.
Our discussion of syndicates (potential coalitions) versus (formed) coalitions under-
lying contractual restrictions had not included the following two kinds of situations:
1. The game TU-game (N, v) is augmented by an exogenously given partition of the
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player set N , called a coalition structure.
2. The forming of coalitions by players in the underlying syndicates is broadened by
allowing players to commit themselves to allocate their cooperation efforts to several
coalitions with possibly different rules for the kinds of cooperation.
The first class had been analyzed under the name “games in partition function form”
by Thrall and Lucas (1963) and is treated in some details in Rapoport (1970, chapter 9).
Some solution concepts based on coalitional structures had been introduced in the 1960s.
Actual work on this, as sketched in Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) under the name “games with
coalition structures”, has its roots and its name from the seminal article by Aumann and
Dreze (1974).
The second class, the “balanced games”, defined independently by Bondareva (1963)
and Shapley (1967) had been proven by Shapley and Shubik (1969) to coincide with “TU
market games”, representing or being generated by the specific class of cardinal concave pure
exchange economies.
In both classes an adequate analysis has to abstain from the assumption of cohesive-
ness - local super-additivity at N in the words of Aumann and Peleg (1960) - that ensures
that any feasible payoff allocation negotiated in coalitions can be afforded by the grand coali-
tion N . A consequence is the renouncement from the assumption of super-additivity that
is necessarily satisfied for any classical (i.e. von Neumann-Morgenstern) characteristic
function. But just the super-additive games build in our opinion the only class on which
the standard definition of a *dual game can be reasonably justified.
3.2 Coalition Functions
The concept of a coalition function v as the essential component of a TU-game (N, v)
was defined in Section 2. Its history and use in game theory and its interpretation are
of fundamental importance for the theory of coalitional TU-games and, in particular, for
the discussion of a suitable concept of a dual game. The dual game of any TU-game
(N, v) is defined in the literature as the TU-game (N, v∗) satisfying the equality v∗(S) =
v(N)− v(N \ S) for every subset S of the player set N . Any attempt to justify or interpret
this definition relies on the meaning of the worth of a coalition in a TU-game (N, v). In case
of the dual game v∗ this leads to a potential conflict between two interpretations of v∗ that
need to be compatible; first, the interpretation of v∗ as a coalition function and the worth
generated by it, and secondly, the interpretation of it as a dual game.
We start with a review of various explanations and interpretations of coalitional and
characteristic functions in the literature. The first appearance of the coalition function in
game theory had been in the treatment of non-cooperative n-person zero-sum games in von
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Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Application of the mini-max theorem for two-person
zero-sum games to each bi-partition {S,N \ S =: T} of the player set N in the strategic
game G, with the coalitions S and T as “players” choosing coordinated joint strategies of
their members led to a value for each of these two-person games, represented by v(S) and
v(T ) = −v(S). The function associating to every S the worth v(S) is characteristic for
the underlying game G and had therefore been called “the characteristic function of the
game G”. This notion had then been extended later in the book to general n-person games.
Such a von Neumann - Morgenstern characteristic function is necessarily super-
additive, and for every super-additive TU-game (N, v) there exist an n-person game G whose
von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function coincides with v (see McKinsey (1952,
Theorem 17.1)). The next detailed, more transparent treatments of the “von Neumann-
Morgenstern theory” or “classical theory” as it is called by Aumann and Peleg (1960) can
be found in McKinsey (1952) and Luce and Raiffa (1957). Both define a characteristic
function without linking it to a given game G just by super-additivity and a worth 0 for
the empty set. Also, Aumann and Peleg (1960) in their foundation of NTU-games use the
term “characteristic function” for their coalitional correspondence which they assume to be
super-additive. Later Rapoport (1970) contains a treatment of the classical theory using the
classic terminology. But to the best of our knowledge, he was the first to derive a different
(not classical) coalitional function from a three-person version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game that fails to be super-additive but is still in a specific way characteristic for that
game and hence also called characteristic function. This non-super-additive characteristic
function is, though not quoted there, a forerunner of Myerson’s (1991) systematic treatment
of three different “characteristic functions” for a game only one of them, the classical von
Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function, is necessarily super-additive. Here super-
additivity appears as an additional assumption that may be imposed on a characteristic
function. According to Myerson, “A characteristic function can also be called a game in
coalitional form or a coalitional game”.
In the next very influential book on game theory, that also covers cooperative games,
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) adopt this terminology and define TU-games as coalitional
games with transferable payoffs without using, however, the term characteristic function or
even giving a name to the function v at all. From the most popular books covering TU-games
published after the year 2000, the term characteristic function without the assumption of
super-additivity is used in Peters (2008). The same definition can be found already in Peleg
and Sudho¨lter (2003) and later in Maschler et al. (2013). But here the term characteristic
function is replaced by coalition function and coalitional function, respectively, terms that
have been adopted in the recent literature on TU-games.
How important the difference between super-additive characteristic functions and
general coalition functions is will become clear once we think about what syndicates can do
in their negotiations and what coalitions can hope to receive in terms of joint payoffs. That
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will be one of the topics of Section 5 where we will motivate, introduce and also defend our
duality concept.
The definition of duality at the beginning of this section relates two generally different
coalitional functions v and v∗. These are not assumed to be super-additive, not even to
be cohesive. As two super-additive TU-games that are dual to each other are necessarily
identical, one can hardly defend a duality concept the meaning of which is dubious for
non-super-additive games.
Next we shall collect and compare some interpretations of TU-games and of dual TU-
games from the literature and check their mutual compatibility. That will lead us to a distinc-
tion between von Neumann-Morgenstern (or classical) characteristic functions, characteristic
functions (per se) that are derived from a strategic game but fail to be super-additive, and
coalition functions that associate a worth to every syndicate S in a player set N paid off to
it once it has formed by mutual agreement on modes of legal cooperation as a coalition. So
every coalitional function that is derivable from a strategic game is a characteristic function.
It is classical if and only if it is super-additive.
4 Duality in the Theory of TU-games
We start this section with a short historical sketch of duality in the theory of TU-games.
The first definition of a dual game we are aware of had been given in Rapoport (1970) for
the very restricted domain of simple games. These are TU-games (N, v) with v(S) either 0
or 1 for all subsets S of N . A coalition S is winning or losing if v(S) = 1 or 0, respectively.
For any simple game (N, v), the dual game (N, v∗) is defined by v∗(S) = 1 if and only if
v(N \S) = 0 that implies that for all S, the number v∗(S)+v(N \S) equals to v(N) = 1. This
duality, for simple games is the one induced by the actual standard definition. Although the
presumed property that supersets of winning syndicates are winning according to Rapoport
reflects that “the super-addivity property of characteristic function” is “preserved”, it is
formally not the case for many simple games. However, the “worth” that can be reached
in these games is always derived from the same “public outcome” established by a winning
coalition. Transfers of payoffs or adding them up are not meaningful operations here, even
if technically possible.
Aumann and Maschler (1985) defined bankruptcy problems and their dual problems
as well as solutions and dual solutions, and represented them by TU-games and their solu-
tions. This approach is presented as one example of dual games and solutions in Oishi and
Nakayama (2009). Funaki (1998) refers to a duality concept for TU-games due to Tadenuma
(1990) and writes:
“Tadenuma (1990) also defines a dual game and examines dual axiomatizations of the
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core and the anti-core. However, his duality is simply defined by a minus value of the original
game. This game is well-defined mathematically, but it is not natural for a class of normal
games with non-negative values. For example, our dualization operator is closed in a class
of monotonic games, but not for his.”
Interestingly, our criticism of the now standard duality defined for all TU-games is
quite similar for the interesting classes of cohesive, super-additive, or balanced games which
fail to be closed under dualization.
Quite a different approach to duality of TU-games has been proposed by Martinez-
Legaz (1996). He considered an informationally equivalent representation of any TU-game
by a non-increasing polyhedral convex function, the indirect function, that is related to
the characteristic function via Fenchel-Moreau generalized conjugation theory. But here
the dual of a TU-game is not a TU-game associated with this game, but rather a dual
(non-TU-game) representation of the original TU-game.
Another approach to duality could be based on the fact that the set of n-person TU-
games is a finite dimensional vector space. Hence a dual game could just be defined as an
element of its dual vector space; i.e., as a linear functional on the space of TU-games. The
balancing weights defined in Section 2 are examples of dual games in this sense. With this
consideration, we are already close to the duality that is underlying the characterization of
games with a non-empty core as balanced games in the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem.
We are not aware of any attempts in the literature to check for any potential relations
between those different duality concepts.
The standard definition of duality at the beginning of Section 3.2 relates two generally
different coalitional functions v and v∗. These are not assumed to be super-additive, not even
to be cohesive. Two super-additive TU-games that are dual to each other are necessarily
identical. Therefore, one can hardly defend a duality concept, the meaning of which for
non-super-additive games, is dubious.
We are going to collect and compare now some interpretations of TU-games and of dual
TU-games from the literature.
Aumann (1967) (for NTU-games with set valued characteristic functions; applicable
here as TU-games are special NTU-games): “The characteristic function associates with
each S ⊂ N , a subset v(S) of ES. Intuitively, v(S) represents the set of payoffs that S
can assure itself. Note that the characteristic function v(S) does not necessarily have to
be interpreted as the set of payoff vectors that S can assure itself; if preferred, it may be
interpreted in any other way, such as what a coalition ’thinks it can get’. It is also possible
that a game is given a priori in characteristic function form.”
Rapoport (1970): “This way of defining the characteristic function is equivalent to
assuming that every coalition can expect that the counter-coalition will do ’its
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worst’; i.e., will act in such a way as to minimize the joint payoff of the first
coalition. Thus the value [worth] of the game to each coalition is supposed to be the
very least it can get if it acts in concert (regardless of what common interest
dictates to the counter-coalition).[That means that any number larger than v(S) could
be prevented by suitable coordinated actions of players in N \ S.]”
Aumann and Maschler (1985): “v(S) represents the total amount of payoff that
the coalition S can get by itself, without the help of other players; it is called the
worth of S.”
Myerson (1991): “Here v(S) is called the worth of coalition S, and it represents the
total amount of transferable utility that the members of S could earn without
any help from the players outside of S.”
Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003): “If S forms in G then its members get the amount v(S)
of money. The number v(S) is called the worth of S. v∗(S) describes the amount which
can be given to S, if the complement N \ S receives what it can reach by cooperation. The
complement N \ S cannot prevent S from [receiving] the amount v∗(S).”
Maschler et al. (2013): “The maximal amount that a coalition can generate through
cooperation is called the worth of the coalition.”
Funaki (1998): “The value of a coalition in the dual of a given game is considered as an
optimistic valuation of the game situation if the original game is considered as a pessimistic
valuation like maximin standard.”
Oishi and Nakayama (2009): “The dual v∗ of a game v assigns to each coalition S the
dual value v∗(S), which is the amount that N \ S cannot prevent S from obtaining.”
Oishi et al. (2016): “For all S ∈ 2N , v(S) represents what coalition S can achieve on
its own. The worth v∗(S) represents the amount that the other agents N \S cannot prevent
S from obtaining in v.”
What can we distill from these various explanations of the meaning of TU-games and
their duals? In order to answer these questions, we have to take regard of the type of coalition
functions the respective authors had in mind. We start with TU-games.
The interpretation of v offered by Oishi et al. (2016), that is essentially also that of
Funaki (1998), seems to coincide with that of Rapoport (1970), Aumann and Maschler
(1985), Myerson (1991), Maschler et al. (2013), who are all referring to the von Neumann-
Morgenstern characteristic function. But the meaning of “can achieve of its own” for a
coalition function, that is not a classical characteristic function, is very different! In the
classical context, the possible actions to achieve something are actions of the coalitions, as
“players”, defined as joint coordinated strategy choices of their members agreed upon in an
underlying strategic n-person game. In the context of non-characteristic general coalition
functions of Oishi et al. (2016), it has to be described in the non-formal socio-economic
14
scenario underlying the specification of v and confirmed in the binding coalition building
contract between the members of a syndicate, what the possible actions of the coalition,
or of the players in the syndicate, are by which monetary payoffs can be achieved. Also,
Aumann (1967) shares the interpretation expressed by “can achieve of its own”, but in
the NTU context of extended characteristic correspondences. But he admits the possibility of
other interpretations and even coalitional correspondences not derived from strategic games.
Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003), also in the general coalition function context, agree with
the explanation of Oishi et al. (2016), without, however, explicitly giving room to any specific
possible actions, beyond signing the coalition forming contract by the members of a syndicate.
It is implicitly taken for granted in this standard interpretation of a coalition function that a
breach of contract is out of the scope, so that any coalition S can be sure to get its worth paid
out in money if its members do not violate the rules of the coalition contract. As cohesiveness
is not a part of the definition of the non-classical TU-games, the case v(S)+v(N \S) > v(N)
for some coalition S cannot be excluded. The grand coalition would be unable then to
afford the total payment. So who is providing the amounts v(S) and v(N \ S)? The logical
consequence is either to restrict the class of TU-games to super-additive (or at least cohesive)
games or to alter the interpretation of the worth, as indicated by Aumann (1967).
We will now focus on dual games. As by definition the set of dual TU-games and of
TU-games are identical we get first for each dual game the same interpretations as offered in
the previous paragraph. We ignore this fact for a while and consider the interpretations of
duality offered in the above quoted literature. Aumann and Maschler (1985) define solutions
and dual solutions for bankruptcy problems. Later they derive TU-games from bankruptcy
problems but do not explicitly mention a duality concept for games. Kikuta (2007) related a
bankruptcy game with another TU-game derived from a “dual” bankruptcy problem used in
Aumann and Maschler (1985) in their definition of a dual solution for bankruptcy problems.
He then introduced twisted pairs of TU-games (N, v) and (N,w) defined by satisfying the
requirement that the game (N, v+w) is additive and shows that the two TU-games derived
from the two bankruptcy games in Aumann and Maschler (1985) are twisted.
Proposition 2 in Oishi and Nakayama (2009) on anti-duality of two bankruptcy games
is just a reformulation of this observation in Kikuta (2007) expressed via their new notion of
anti-dual games. Oishi et al. (2016) introduce also anti-dual solutions for TU-games
on the basis of anti-dual games. This concept of anti-duality had been introduced already
by Kikuta (2007) under the name negative duality. (There is another concept of twisted
duality of TU-games introduced by Kikuta (2007) we will not deal with in our paper.)
The presently standard duality concept defined in Section 3.2 appears according to our
knowledge first in Funaki (1998) who interprets the dual v∗ as an “optimistic valuation of the
game” in contrast to the pessimistic valuation represented by v. The problem with Funaki’s
interpretations, that remind of the different characteristic functions analyzed in Myerson
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(1991) based on different strategic behavior of players in an underlying non-cooperative
game, is the following: it remains completely unclear what the game situation is that v and
v∗ valuate differently when (N, v) and (N, v∗) are themselves the games to be compared. The
identical interpretation of v∗ in Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003), Oishi and Nakayama (2009) and
Oishi et al. (2016) is clear and understandable. But is it compatible with the interpretation
of v? Consider the formulation of Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003):
“v∗(S) describes the amount which can be given to S, if the complement N \ S receives
what it can reach by cooperation. The complement N \ S cannot prevent S from [receiving]
the amount v∗(S).”
Assuming the legal right of coalition S to receive its worth v(S), it is obvious that S
cannot “be given” an amount smaller than v(S). As v∗(S) “can be given” to S provided
N \S receives its guaranteed payoff v(N \S), we conclude that v∗(S) cannot be smaller than
v(S). Therefore v∗(S) = v(N)−v(N \S) ≥ v(S), hence v(N) ≥ v(S) +v(N \S). Therefore,
the concurrent validity of the interpretations of TU-games and dual TU-games in the above
quoted literature is not self-contradicting only if the game (N, v) is cohesive. Applying the
same interpretations also to subgames is therefore only consistent for super-additive games.
In the case of super-additive, hence cohesive games the interpretation of v∗ found in the
above quotations is equivalent to the following one:
x∗ := v∗(S) is the unique aggregate payoff to coalition S that makes the payoff
allocation (x∗, v(N \ S)) for the bi-partition {S,N \ S} of N attainable and Pareto effi-
cient. This interpretation can be literally adopted for all TU-games, as instead of the grand
coalition the most “productive” partition is the benchmark for efficiency. We shall base our
alternative definition of dual games on this observation.
5 A new definition of duality for TU-games
The maybe most troublesome deficiency of the current theory of coalitional games is the
combination of an extension of the classical theory of characteristic functions in which the
assumption of super-additivity as a part of the definition of the game is waived, but the
feasibility and efficiency of payoff vectors are still determined with respect to the grand
coalition. Already Rapoport (1970, p. 287) remarked: “Game theory is virtually silent on
the question of which coalitions are likely to form.” The importance of altering this situation
has been recognized by many game theorists, yet, without much change. So we find that
despite countless heavy criticisms of this fact, starting with Bo¨hm (1974), Neuefeind (1974)
and Guesnerie and Oddou (1979), no strong lasting effect can be observed in the literature.
This state of coalitional game theory is exemplified by two statements in the most recent
book on game theory authored by highly reputed game theorists! In Maschler et al. (2013,
p. 672), we find:
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“The main questions that are the focus of coalitional game theory include: What hap-
pens when the players play the game? What coalitions will form, and if a coalition S is
formed, how does it divide the worth v(S) among its members?”
And some lines later:
“The answers to these two questions are quite different. The question regarding the
coalitional structure that the players can be expected to form is a difficult one, and will not
be addressed in this book. We will often assume that the grand coalition N is formed and
ask how will the players divide among them the worth v(N).”
Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) do consider games with coalition structure. But that is
exogenously given and the efficiency of that structure is not an issue. Also, duality in this
modified framework is not discussed or only defined.
5.1 Feasibility and efficiency
We shall start our approach to duality by changing the notions of feasibility and efficiency
in such a way that they are applicable in all TU-games and coincide with the versions now
dominating the literature once the considered games are super-additive. So instead of taking
the worth of the grand coalition as the upper bound for affordable aggregate payoffs to all
players in N , we take the upper bound over all coalition structures (i. e., partitions of N) of
the sums of worths of their member syndicates. This number is vc(N) = v˜(N). The effect
of this change on the duality discussion is that once a coalition N \S has received her worth
v(N \ S), the payoff v˜(N)− v(N \ S) to S is still affordable and not smaller than v(S), its
legally guaranteed worth. So it could be “given to S”. In effect, we choose the middle one
in size of the three versions of sets of feasible payoff vectors for a game (N, v) discussed in
Bejan and Gomez (2012), and denoted by them as X∗Π(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) ≤ v(pi) for
some pi ∈ Π(N)}. We have already argued at length why we do not constrain ourselves to
X∗(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) ≤ v(N)}. We will explain later why we do not follow Bejan
and Gomez (2012) in considering X∗B(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) ≤ v(λß) for some ß ∈ B}.
5.2 What N \ S cannot prevent S from receiving
In this section we shall discuss how the interpretation in the literature of the meaning of
v∗ in our new context of feasibility and efficiency can be formally represented in a coherent
way.
Apparently, the result depends on whether we interpret S and N \S as just syndicates,
i. e., subsets of N , or as coalitions that have already been formed. As these considerations
should be part of the pre-play negotiations about coalition building, we may assume that a
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syndicate is likely to build a coalition only if forming that coalition is not Pareto dominated
by any partition of it into sub-coalitions. So all players in all syndicates may assume that
whatever coalition S they finally will be a member of, the players in the syndicate N \ S
have organized themselves in sub-syndicates of N \S forming coalitions. For these coalitions
T , we must have v(T ) = v˜(T ). These considerations are similarly motivated as those that
had led to the use of aspirations in the literature. See our discussion in Subsection 5.5.
If it is common knowledge among the players in N that the players in a syndicate S
know that there remains at most v˜(N)− v˜(N \S) to be allocated to them, they will organize
themselves in such way in a partition of S that the sum of the worths of the resulting
subsets becomes maximal, i. e., (v|S)c(S) = v˜(S). But this is affordable for the players in
S. All these considerations determine for each syndicate S that has formed a coalition or
a partition of coalitions committed to cooperate that the worst their members may expect
from the complement syndicate N \ S is that it absorbs v˜(N \ S). So while the players in
S in its final structure of sub-coalitions have a legal right to get the aggregate payoff v˜(S)
they may expect v˜(N) − v˜(N \ S) as the largest amount that the players in N \ S cannot
prevent them from receiving. Clearly, that cannot be smaller than v˜(S).
These considerations justify our following definition of a dual game.
Definition 1. Let (N, v) be a TU-game. Then its dual game (N, vd) is defined by vd(S) =
v˜(N)− v˜(N \ S) for all subsets S of N .
Lemma 1. For every super-additive TU-game (N, v), one has vd = v∗.
Remark 1. Our definition of duality reflects the idea that the players of any syndicate that
is forming a coalition in (N, v) do so only if v(S) = v˜(S).
5.3 Why partitions rather than balanced families?
In the definition of a TU-game as a pair (N, v) the coalitional function associates to any
subset (= syndicate) S of N a worth v(S) that S has a legal right to receive once it has
committed to forming a coalition in which its members cooperate according to the rules
embodied in v. That the assumption of super-additivity, that is not a defining property of a
game, implies a restriction of the class of TU-games has been the reason for our introduction
of our new duality concept. The classical question of coalitional game theory has been:
“What coalition will form, and if a coalition S is formed, how does it divide the worth
v(S) among its members?”
The forming of coalitions necessarily results in a coalition structure, i. e., in a partition
of the player set N and for each coalition the worth v(S) to be divided among the members
of S. Partial simultaneous memberships in several coalitions is, though a coherent concept,
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not part of the classical problem. In order to formalize it one needs to extend the notion
of a game from (N, v) to (N,w) with w : 2N × R+ → R such that w(S, t) := tv(S) for
any (S, t) ∈ 2N × R+. Depending on the socio-economic scenario represented by (N, v) this
may or may not be a coherent way of defining an “extended” TU game. The resulting
analogue of the classical question quoted above would then be: What families of coalitions
with part-time memberships will be formed? How are the part-times for different coalitions
and members related? How is the worth for a part-time coalition defined and divided among
the members?
While in the context of partitions a coalition’s worth is just a real number as mem-
bership is indivisible, in the context of balanced families a coalition’s worth is a function
mapping degrees of membership to shares of the coalition’s worth in its classical meaning.
Answers to the above questions are indeed given for balanced or even totally balanced games.
We shall discuss that context also later, when we discuss a derivation of our duality from the
Bondareva-Shapley duality of linear programs [cf. for instance Myerson (1991, p. 432-433)].
5.4 The relation between our duality and reduced games
Among the axioms on which solution concepts for TU-games are based, in the literature
the notion of a reduced game for some syndicate S is contingent on an aggregate payoff
x(N \ S) for the players in N \ S. The most prominent version of a reduced game is the
one defined in Davis and Maschler (1965) that, however, is based on the implicit assumption
that the grand coalition is formed. In order to get rid of this restriction, Bejan and Gomez
(2012) adopted in their analysis a modified definition of a reduced game which according
to them had been used, among others, by Moldovanu and Winter (1994) and Hokari and
Kıbrıs (2003). Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003, Remark 2.3.12) describe the worth of any subset
T of a coalition S, given general agreement among all players in the game about x(N \ S)
as the aggregate payoff for the syndicate N \ S, by vS,x(T ). This worth is interpreted as
the (maximal) total payoff that the coalition T expects to get. The TU-game vS,x is the
reduced game with respect to S and x. According to them, (S, vS,x) is “not a game in
the ordinary sense”, whatever that means. It serves only to determine the distribution of
vS,x(S) to the members of S. Apart from the special treatment of the grand coalition in the
definition of the Davis-Maschler-reduced game it coincides with that of the modified version.
The latter one is defined by vS,x(T ) := max{v(T ∪Q)− x(Q)} over all subsets Q of N \ S.
We had already argued above that in the simultaneous pre-play negotiations by all
players, performed in all syndicates they are members of, rational players will form coalitions
efficiently. That means for a syndicate S whose members have committed to cooperate
in the game they will generate an optimal partition of S whose members will form the
coalitions cooperating in the game accordingly. The best that S can afford by its members
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is, therefore, v˜(S). The most what they may expect is what is left from v˜(N) if the members
of N \ S behave in the same way as those of S did, namely v˜(N) − v˜(N \ S) =: vd(S).
If our game v happens to be cohesive and the x(N \ S) above equals to v˜(N \ S) then
we get vd(S) = v˜(N) − v˜(N \ S) = v(N) − v˜(N \ S) = vS,x(S). So our definition of a
dual game is consistent with associating with any coalition (as distinguished from syndicate)
the worth vS,x(S), i. e., the maximal aggregate payoff that the syndicate N \ S cannot
prevent the coalition S from receiving. Only if x(N) = v˜(N) we have v˜(S) = x(S) and
v˜(N \ S) = x(N \ S), hence vd(S) + v˜(N \ S) = v˜(N) = v˜(S) + vd(N \ S).
5.5 Duality of TU-games via Bondareva-Shapley duality
One of the most important concepts (not only) in cooperative game theory is the core of
a game. Defined for TU and NTU-games, it is of fundamental importance for economic
theory. Introduced by Edgeworth (1881) under the name of contract curve in his analysis
of perfect competition in pure exchange economies, it had been identified by Shubik (1959)
as a forerunner of the core of TU-games defined by Gillies (1953) and Shapley (1953) (cf.
Zhao, 2018) and used to analyze market games. The famous Core-Walras equivalence had
been established in various settings in seminal articles by Debreu and Scarf (1963), Aumann
(1964) and Anderson (1978). A version for TU-games can be derived from Theorem 1 in
Shapley and Shubik (1975).
In the context of general TU-games the set of feasible payoff vectors is usually defined
as X∗(N, v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) ≤ v(N)} and the set of Pareto efficient payoff vectors, also
called pre-imputations, is X(N, v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)}. The set I(N, v) := {x ∈
X(N, v) | x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N} is called set of imputations of (N, v). As explained earlier
the employed notions of feasibility and Pareto efficiency are perfectly adequate for cohesive
games, they are incompatible for non-cohesive games where there exist subsets S and N \ S
of N for which a payoff vector y with y(N) := v(S) + v(N \ S) = v˜(S) + v˜(N \ S) > v(N)
is a Pareto improvement upon x with x(N) = v(N). In this game rational players will not
join the grand coalition with a maximal aggregate payoff v(N).
An alternative to imputations that avoids this inconsistency offer aspirations. Ac-
cording to Bennett (1983) “they had been first proposed by Cross (1967), were reinvented
and carefully studied in Turbay’s dissertation (1977)”, and again “reinvented and applied
to coalitional economies in Wooders’ working paper (1978). Albers (1979) presented sev-
eral variants of core and kernel solution concepts (von Neumann-Morgenstern solution, core,
bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus) to the space of aspirations.”
A careful assessment of aspirations versus imputations involving balanced but not nec-
essarily super-additive games is provided by Bejan and Gomez (2012). They also give an
axiomatization of the “aspiration core” a solution concept that satisfies non-emptiness on the
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class of all TU-games and coincides with the core whenever it is non-empty, i. e., on the class
of balanced games. This equivalence of balancedness of a TU-game and the non-emptiness
of its core is the content of the famous Bondareva-Shapley Theorem that had independently
been proven in Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967).
Before we consider these dual problems, we need some more definitions which we par-
tially adopt from Bejan and Gomez (2012). We will contrast aspirations with pre-imputations
and compare them with our new concept of allotments. These three different classes of
payoff vectors result from different definitions of feasibility and efficiency.
The classical definition of a feasible set of payoff vectors for a TU-game (N, v) is
X∗(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) ≤ v(N)}. It is meaningful under the restriction to super-
additive or at least cohesive games. But in the context of all TU-games it is a serious hardly
justifiable constraint. The classical efficiency concept based on this version of feasibility is
embodied in the following version of a Pareto optimal set of feasible payoffs (cf Peleg and
Sudho¨lter, 2003), the so-called set of pre-imputations: X(N, v) = {x ∈ X∗(N, v) | x(N) =
v(N)} = argmax{x(N) | x ∈ X∗(N, v)}. Having the whole class of TU-games in mind this
is a constrainted efficiency or, in economics terms, second best efficiency.
The core (Gillies, 1959) is defined as C(N, v) = {x ∈ X∗(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all
S ⊆ N}.
The contrast program to approaching solutions of games in terms of pre-imputations or,
if they are individually rational, imputations had been initiated mainly by Bennett (1983).
She had in mind the players’ visions and expectations in the preplay coalitional negotiations.
First, she defined for any game (N, v) an anticipation as a payoff vector x such that for each
player i, there exists a syndicate S with i as member, such that x(S) ≤ v(S). Then, based
on this notion, she defined aspirations as special anticipations and proved the following more
transparent characterization to be equivalent to her definition:
The payoff vector x ∈ RN is an aspiration if and only if it satisfies the followings:
(1) x(S) ≥ v(S) for every syndicate S in N ,
(2) For each i in N , there exists a syndicate S containing i such that x(S) = v(S).
The aspiration x is a balanced aspiration if x′(S) ≥ x(S) for every aspiration x′ and
any S ∈ N .
This corresponds to the minimization problem (9.2) in Myerson (1991, p. 432) with the
exception that Myerson did not use the restriction 2 of Bennett. As (2) is not implied by
(1), the payoff vectors used by Myerson are not aspirations. Nevertheless, both problems
have identical solutions, namely the balanced aspirations of (N, v). The set of balanced
aspirations of a game (N, v) is called the aspiration core of (N, v) and denoted Asp(N, v).
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The term balanced is derived from the solution of the dual maximization problem (9.3) of
Myersons’ minimization problem (9.2) formulated as:
max
µ∈RN+
〈
µ, v
〉
subject to
〈
µ,1•(i)
〉
= 1 for all i ∈ N ,
where µ’s are the vectors of balancing weights. The solutions of both problems x∗ and
µ∗ result in the joint optimal value x∗(N) = vb(N).
Next we look at the feasible and efficient sets underlying the aspiration core.
The set of feasible payoff vectors of (N, v) is X∗B(N, v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) ≤
v(λß) for some ß ⊆ N}. The set of efficient payoff vectors for every (N, v) is defined as
XB(N, v) = argmax{x(N) | x ∈ X∗B(N, v)}. AC(N, v) = {x ∈ X∗B(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for
all S ⊆ N} is the aspiration core of the game (N, v).
In a non-balanced game v, we have v(N) < vb(N) and the partial memberships in
coalitions by which vb(N) can be established is out of the scope in the game (N, v). No
partition of N can legally claim that amount. Therefore, we do not share the view that
the aspiration core should be considered as a solution concept for non-balanced games. As
mentioned already earlier, only in “share-extended” TU-games (N,w) one should consider
AC(N,w) as a solution set. That is obviously applicable also in share-extended TU-games
where the v-part of w is not balanced.
We had rejected two of the three feasibility and efficiency concepts in Bejan and Gomez
(2012). The classical one involved a drastic restriction to the class of cohesive games which by
definition exclude Pareto superior imputations. The other one, favored by Bejan and Gomez
(2012), extended the classical problem of coalition building in a way similar to extending
domains of sets by including fuzzy sets. For many socio-economic scenarios represented
aptly by non-balanced games, the feasible set determined via balanced families of syndicates
is simply to large and degrades the adequate efficiency unjustly to a second-best level.
As we know, partitions of N are special balanced families and support their associ-
ated balancing weights. Given a partition pi ∈ Π(N) (as a balanced family of coalitions),〈
µ,1•(i)
〉
degenerates for every player i in N to
〈
1pi(•),1•(i)
〉
. Therefore, the problem
(9.3) will be modified to the following maximization problem (B) with
(B) max
pi∈Π(N)
〈
1pi(•), v
〉
subject to for all i ∈ N,
〈
1pi(•),1•(i)
〉
= 1 .
The dual problem (A) of problem (B) is
(A) min
x∈RN
x(N) subject to for all S ⊆ N, x(S) ≥ max
pi∈Π(S)
∑
T∈pi
v(T ).
Any x ∈ RN satisfying the feasibility condition defined by the constraint in (A) is called
an allotment. Any allotment x satisfies for all S ∈ N , x(N) ≥ v˜(S) + v˜(N \ S).
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The joint value for the optima of the dual problems (A) and (B) is smaller than for
those in (9.2) and (9.3) of Myerson (1991). The domain in (A) was extended by relaxing
the constraints while that of (B) shrank to the partitions of N . The optima for (A) and (B)
are, respectively, xˆ and pˆi with xˆ(N) =
〈
1pˆi(•), v
〉
= vc(N) = v˜(N).
If we presume that any syndicate S as a prospective coalition considers during preplay
negotiations to proceed in the subgame guided by optimization problems of types (A) and
(B) they will end up with (v|S)c(S) = v˜(S). That means that in the considerations of S
about what a coalition N \ S could not prevent them from receiving they should assume
that v˜(N \ S) would be given in total to the coordinated sub-coalitions which the syndicate
would form by organizing itself optimally. So the only version of Bondareva-Shapley duality
that is adequate for all TU-games leads again to our duality.
Despite the efficieny of self-organization of the syndicates S and N \S resulting in v˜(S)
and v˜(N \S), the overall self-organization of the players in N may not be efficient. We may
have v˜(N) > v˜(S) + v˜(N \ S). So the simultaneous payoffs vd(S) and vd(N \ S) together
may still be an utopia allocation. Notice, however, that it is possible to rewrite
∑
T∈p˜i
v(T )
as v˜(S∗) + v˜(N \ S∗) for some S∗ ∈ N . For such S∗, we have v˜(N) − v˜(S∗) = v˜(N \ S∗) =
vd(N \ S∗) and v˜(N) − v˜(N \ S∗) = v˜(S∗) = vd(S∗). This split of N in to S∗ and N \ S∗
respresents an efficient organization of all players in N in a bi-partition in which the utopia
worths vd(S∗), vd(N \ S∗) become feasible in (N, v).
The game (N, vc) is dual to (N, v) if for every syndicate S in (N, v) one has vc(N \S) =
v˜(N) − v˜(S). It is easy to see that this duality coincides with the *duality on the class
of super-additive games. But what happens on balanced games? Assume that (N, v) is
balanced. In that case v(N) = vc(N) = v˜(N) = vb(N). That shows that also for balanced
and totally balanced games, our duality definition is adequate.
We know that for any game (N, v), one has v(N) ≤ vc(N) = v˜(N) ≤ vb(N). We
consider now which further modification (A’) and (B’) of our problems (A) and (B) will
result in v(N). If we define (B’) by restricting the set of partitions of N in problem (B)
to the singleton partition, there remains {N}. This is the only feasible partition satisfying〈
1pi(•),1•(i)
〉
= 1 for all i ∈ N and therefore optimal in (B’) and yields the optimal value
v(N).
Replacing in (A) the term for all “S ⊆ N” to just “S = N” the problem degenerates
to
(A’) min
x∈RN
x(N) subject to x(N) ≥ ∑
T∈{N}
v(T ) = v(N).
This is equivalent to min
x∈RN
x(N) subject to x(N) ≥ v(N) where the optimal value is
clearly v(N).
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The problems (A’) and (B’) debunk how restrictive it is to define feasibility and effi-
ciency with regard to v(N). In our terminology that is the case where N is the only coalition,
where players of all syndicates can at best use the various worths they would have received
if they would have formed a coalition as arguments in the internal negotiation of payoffs
within the grand coalition. Only if (N, v) happened to be cohesive, the grand coalition can
be assumed to form.
5.6 Duality of TU-games and Market Representations
There is a literature on markets and NTU-games, that is, however, not of our concern in this
article. Representative articles are Scarf (1967), Billera (1974), Billera and Bixby (1974),
Qin (1993) and Inoue (2012).
The usual meaning of “market games” is based on work of Shapley and Shubik, who
following their earlier works Shapley (1953) and Shubik (1959), had in Shapley and Shubik
(1969) introduced market games as a specific class of TU-games and proven that these are
exactly the totally balanced games. In their following work on this topic, Shapley and
Shubik (1975) had analyzed the relation between payoff vectors in the core of the TU-game
and their representation of competitive equilibria in the markets inducing this game.
Later the class of this TU-games that result from economies of various sort had been
extended. Garratt and Qin (1996, 1997, 2000) introduced market models that can be rep-
resented by super-additive games [see also Bejan and Gomez (2012)]. Sun et al. (2008)
presented a coalition production economy that is induced by an arbitrary TU-game (N, v).
They proved the equivalence between the c-Core of (N, v) and the utility allocation of com-
petitive equilibria of the induced economy. Inoue (2012) simplified this model by reducing
the number of output commodities to just one (“money”) allowing two versions, one with
divisible and one with indivisible labor input of agents, permitting respective excluding
“multiple jobbing” of agents, i.e., working part time in different coalitions. Multiple jobbing
is based on the possibility of the players to organize themselves in balanced families rather
than only in partitions of N . Therefore, only the “single jobbing” model of Inoue (2012) is
adequate for representing TU-games in our classical framework.
While explanation of coalition building via competitive equilibria of representing
economies or the core of the games is only possible if the games are at least c-balanced
(cf. Sun et al., 2008), it is still possible via efficient production and the coalitions being ac-
tive in this production for arbitrary TU-games and their induced “single jobbing” coalition
production economies. We will focus now on this model. For technicalities and detailed
interpretation, we refer to the relatively short article Inoue (2012).
Like in Shapley and Shubik (1969) market games, each player of the game has one
indivisible unit of an idiosyncratic endowment good, “his labor time”. Each coalition S ∈ N
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has a technology Yv(S) by which a coalition S can produce tv(S), t ≥ 0 if each member of
S provides t of its input good labor. Indivisibility implies for each player his t to be either 0
or 1. So the coalition is built if its production set is activated by all members of S providing
their full endowments. If the “right” coalitions build, they form a partition pi of N that in
total produces
∑
T∈pi
v(T ) = vc(N) = v˜(N).
This is even the case if the considered game is a (totally balanced) market game. As
Shapley and Shubik (1975) remark, the competitive (core) payoff vectors of (N, v) are exactly
those which maximize the players’ total utility (payoff). That is, v¯(N) = vc(N) = v˜(N).
Notice that several coalition structures pi ∈ Π(N) may be able to produce the aggregate
amount vc(N).
As Inoue’s representation of TU-games with the characteristic function v by “single
jobbing” coalition production economies Ev holds for all TU-games, it also applies to the
dual vd. We know already that for any active coalition in Evd the efficient production is
vd(S). Remember, what vd(S) is meaning with respect to the underlying game (N, v):
vd(S) = v˜(N)− v˜(N \ S) ≥ v˜(S) for all S ∈ N .
Therefore, as vd(S)− v˜(S) describes the residual amount that S might receive if, given N \S
receives its maximal legally guaranteed payoff v˜(N \ S), the allocation (vd(S), v˜(N \ S))
would be efficient.
vd(S) and vd(N \ S) describe the residual efficiency gap that need to be paid to
S and N \ S, respectively, if N \ S or S are already determined to get v˜(N \ S) or v˜(S),
respectively.
An allocation (vd(S), vd(N \S)) is in general not feasible in the economy Ev or the game
(N, v). But an optimal aggregate payoff in (N, v) can be produced by a suitable partition
pi∗ ∈ Π(N). So we get ∑
T∈pi∗
v(T ) = vc(N) = v˜(N).
Any bi-partition {S,N\S} generated via unions of syndicates in pi∗ satisfies v˜(S)+v˜(N\
S) = v˜(N). For such “efficient” bi-partition, we get again v˜(N\S) = v˜(N)−v˜(S) = vd(N\S)
and v˜(S) = v˜(N) − v˜(N \ S) = vd(S). This implies immediately that v˜(S) = vd(S) and
v˜(N \ S) = vd(N \ S), which means that neither S nor N \ S is suffering from forgone
opportunities, since both of the residual efficiency gaps are zero.
On the other hand, we know that for arbitrary S ∈ N , we have vd(S) + vd(N \ S) =
v˜(N)− v˜(S) + v˜(N)− v˜(N \ S) = 2v˜(N)− (v˜(S) + v˜(N \ S)) ≥ v˜(N).
What we have received is that min
S∈N
(vd(S) + vd(N \ S)) = max
S∈N
(v˜(S) + v˜(N \ S)) =
vc(N) = v˜(N). So if each i ∈ N is active in some coalition in the economy Evd the minimum
that can be produced in the aggregate makes it just feasible and efficient in the economy
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Ev. So the dual economy Evd of Ev just produces via inefficiency in the production Ev. One
could say that Evd “produces” opportunity costs vd(S) − v˜(S) while Ev produces revenues
v˜(S). If revenues are maximal due to the efficient production and organisation of coalitions
in a partition, opportunity cost generated in Evd are vd(S)− v˜(S) = 0.
6 Some Results on Duality
Lemma 1. If (N, v) is super-additive, vd(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) = v∗(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Proof. The super-additivity of (N, v) implies that v˜(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N . Thus, vd(S) =
v˜(N)− v˜(N \ S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) = v∗(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Proposition 1. If (N, v) is a convex game, then the dual game (N, vd) is concave.
Proof. Let (N, v) be a convex game. As convexity implies super-additivity, we conclude from
Lemma 1 that vd(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
Let S, T be two arbitrary subsets of N .
vd(S) + vd(T ) = v(N)− v(N \ S) + v(N)− v(N \ T ) = 2v(N)− (v(N \ S) + v(N \ T ))
≥ 2v(N)−(v(N \(S∪T ))+v(N \(S∩T ))) = vd(S∪T )+vd(S∩T ) where the inequality
is obtained by the convexity of (N, v).
Definition 2. The negative-dual (or anti-dual) game of a game (N, v) is the game (N, vnd)
with vnd = −vd.
Proposition 2. If (N, v) is a convex game, then so is its negative-dual game (N, vnd).
Proof. (N, v) is super-additive as it is convex. So, it is enough to show that (N,−v∗) is
convex since vnd = −vd = −v∗.
We know from Oishi and Nakayama (2009) that the set of convex games is invariant
under the negative-dual (anti-dual) operator. Thus, (N,−v∗) is convex, and so is (N, vnd).
Proposition 3. If (N, v) is balanced, then (N, vnd) is balanced.
Proof. Let (N, v) be balanced. Then, Core(N, v) 6= ∅. Take an arbitrary x from Core(N, v).
We know x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N , and also x(N) = v(N) = v˜(N) by the fact that
balancedness of a TU-game implies its cohesiveness.
Consider −x. Clearly, −x(N) = −v˜(N) = vnd(N).
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Take any coalition T ⊂ N .
vnd(T ) = −vd(T ) = −v˜(N) + v˜(N \ T ) = −v(N) + max
P∈P(N\T )
∑
C∈P v(C)
≤ −v(N) + max
P∈P(N\T )
∑
C∈P x(C)
= −v(N) + x(N \ T ) = −x(N) + x(N \ T ) = −x(T ),
where the inequality is clear by the fact that x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N .
Thus, −x ∈ Core(N, vnd).
Remark 2. By Proposition 3, we have the following results:
• The set of balanced games is invariant under the negative-dual operator,
• Core(N, vnd) is non-empty if (N, v) is a balanced game.
Proposition 4. If (N, v) is a balanced game, then Core(N, v) = −Core(N, vnd).
Proof. By Proposition 3, we have Core(N, v) ⊆ −Core(N, vnd).
Let x ∈ Core(N, vnd). Then, x(N) = vnd(N) = −vd(N) = −v˜(N) = −v(N) and
x(S) ≥ vnd(S) for all S ⊂ N .
Consider −x. Since x is in Core(N, vnd), we get −x(N \ S) ≤ −vnd(N \ S) = v˜(N)−
v˜(S) = v(N) − v˜(S) ≤ v(N) − v(S) = −x(N) − v(S). Thus, −x(N \ S) ≤ −x(N) − v(S),
i. e., v(S) ≤ −x(S).
Since −x(S) ≥ v(S) and −x(N) = v(N), we have −x ∈ Core(N, v).
By Proposition 4, one can conclude that on the domain of balanced games, the core is
“self-anti-dual” as Oishi et al. (2016) call it.
Definition 3. A TU-game (N, v) is called c-balanced game if its completion (N, vc) is a
balanced game.
Proposition 5. If (N, v) is a c-balanced game, so is (N, vnd).
Proof. By the hypothesis, we know (N, vc) is a balanced game and so is its negative-dual.
Then, by the cohesiveness of (N, vc), on any coalition we have (vc)nd = −(vc)d = −vd = vnd.
Hence, (N, vnd) is a balanced game. Since a balanced game (N, v) is also c-balanced, (N, vnd)
is a c-balanced game.
Proposition 6. The core is not self-anti-dual on the set of c-balanced games.
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Proof. Let (N, v) be c-balanced, but not balanced. So Core(N, v) = ∅ and (N, vc) is bal-
anced.
By Proposition 4, we also have Core(N, vc) = −Core(N, (vc)nd). Additionally,
(vc)nd = vnd as shown in the previous proposition. Thus, Core(N, vnd) = Core(N, (vc)nd) =
−Core(N, vc) 6= ∅.
Since −Core(N, vnd) 6= Core(N, v), the core is not self-anti-dual on c-balanced games.
Combining the results above, we get the fact that unlike the core, the c-core is self-
anti-dual on the set of c-balanced games: (N, vnd) is c-balanced whenever (N, v) is c-
balanced. By the help of Proposition 4, c–Core(N, v) = Core(N, vc) = −Core(N, (vc)nd) =
−Core(N, vnd). Clearly, (N, vnd) is balanced (so cohesive) as its core is non-empty, which
implies Core(N, vnd) = c–Core(N, vnd). Thus, we get c–Core(N, v) = − c–Core(N, vnd).
7 Concluding remarks: Summary and Outlook
7.1 Summary
We have introduced a new concept of duality for general TU-games that is not based on
the second best efficiency defined via the grand coalition as the reference point, but rather
on Pareto efficiency with the most productive coalition structures as a benchmark. These
two concepts coincide on super-additive games, where the grand coalition builds its most
productive (singleton) partition.
The predominant interpretation of the duality, that is meaningful for super-additive
games, leads in general to logical inconsistency but can be maintained with our duality
concept. We have provided various different strands of arguments for the use of our new
concept and provided in Section 6 results paralleling or deviating from results found in the
recent duality literature, predominantly by Oishi and Nakayama (2009) and Oishi et al.
(2016).
The key concept of our definition of duality, the cohesive hull (or completion) of a TU-
game admitted to cover also balanced and totally balanced games although in a strict sense
these are linear homogeneous extensions of coalitional TU-games.
Still our much more general concept does not satisfactorily cover all games in all its
interpretations, like the restricted class of super-additive games that suggests an interpreta-
tion of the worth as a gain that players want to maximize. Like the usual *duality, also our
duality implicitly interprets worth as gain, profit, or saving rather than a loss, cost or debt.
From a puristic point of view our duality, like the *duality, only an “upper duality” defined,
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and in contrast to *duality meaningfully interpretable for all coalitional TU-games. It is nei-
ther the sign (− versus +) nor the notation (c versus v) that characterizes TU-games as cost
games. These can, however, according to Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003, p. 14) be “associated
with ordinary games, called savings games” and are “not games from the point of view of
applications, because the cost function is not interpreted as an ordinary coalition function”.
As any game is strategically equivalent to positive games and to negative games any cost
game can be represented as positive and any “ordinary” game as negative. It is just the
interpretation of a game, i.e., of its payoffs as utilities or revenues as opposed to dis-utilities
or costs that determines, what efficient payoff vectors are. A sound analysis of options for
syndicates of players in pre-play negotiations presumes their agreement on the interpretation
of efficiency, hence the choice between maximizing and minimizing the aggregate worth.
7.2 Outlook
A common understanding among players in a game of what efficiency in that game means is
necessary for potential cooperation. The focus on players agreement on efficiency suggests
naturally the idea of defining and analyzing also a “lower duality”. Based on efficiency
rather than on maximization of gains or minimization of costs, one may get such universally
applicable duality notion for all TU-games, embodying upper and lower duality.
In this context we would like to hint to the remarkable article by Derks et al. (2014).
Although they are not directly concerned with duality and the grand coalition still serves
as a benchmark, their analysis may be seminal for further work on duality as their solution
concepts cover the core as well as the anti-core. In their abstract, they write:
“We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with
transferable utility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a
specific way, by sidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allo-
cations is called the undominated set, and we show that it consists of finitely many polytopes
with a core-like structure. One of these polytopes is L1-center, consisting of all efficient allo-
cations that minimize the sum of the absolute values of excesses. The excess Pareto optimal
set contains the allocations that are Pareto optimal in the set obtained by ordering the sums
of the absolute values of the excesses of coaltions and the absolute values of the excesses of
their complements. The L1-center is contained in the excess Pareto-optimal set, which in
turn is contained in the undominated set. For three-person games all these sets coincide.
These three sets also coincide with the core for balanced games and with the anticore for an-
tibalanced games. We study properties of these sets and provide characterizations in terms
of balanced collections of coalitions.”
It may be worthwhile to try to build on these ideas but with Pareto efficiency rather than
second best efficiency, with v˜(N) for v(N) and with partitions of N for balanced families.
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